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Abstract 
 
Which structural macroeconomic shocks have typified rising house prices? What ultimate factors 
have compromised financial stability and risk? These questions are answered for the Venezuelan 
economy by estimating a FAVAR model with macroeconomic, banking and asset price 
variables. We find that real house prices only respond to demand shocks occurring at aggregate 
or sectorial level. Most significant house price growths also take place with greater financial 
exposure to mortgages and real domestic currency depreciations, two factors that potentially 
magnify rising house prices. Monetary expansions from fiscal origin also increase house prices. 
In terms of banks’ performance, we find that credit is directed toward firms for expansionary 
supply shocks, but toward household   spending, on goods or housing, for expansionary demand 
shocks. In all these cases, banking leverage increases, but mainly when shocks have a significant 
effect on output. Rising risk and financial instability stem from the combination of growing 
interest rates and domestic currency appreciation, two events that provide incentives for banks to 
re-arrange portfolio allocation at the cost of a higher volatility of returns. Increasing risk seems 
to be strongly conditioned by abrupt reductions in banks’ liabilities.  
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I. Introduction 
 
An aspect of great relevance for policy-makers is whether credit and asset price booms can 
endanger the stability of the financial system and the entire economy. Empirical research, based 
on different countries’ experiences, has helped to identifying some of the conditions that 
anticipate financial crises. An emerging consensus is that high levels of banking credit and 
leverage increase the probability of observing financial crises (Schularick and Taylor, 2012 and 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). 
 
On the other hand, the emergence in the US of a house prices bubble prior to the 2008 financial 
crisis has led to ask about the causal relationship between credit, house prices and financial 
crises. As Goodhart and Hofmann (2007) state, there are several theoretical channels that can 
give account of the clear endogeneity (or bi-directional causality) existing between banking 
credit and house prices. However, because banking credit can have a direct theoretical link with 
monetary policy decisions, the question that naturally arises is whether monetary policy explains 
house price bubbles. In this sense, Eickmeier and Hofmann (2013) claim that US monetary 
policy shocks have a highly significant and persistent effect on house prices. This result is 
extended for several advanced countries by Bordo and Landon-Lane (2013). Therefore, 
according to these works, monetary policy has a prominent role for explaining house price 
booms, and potentially, financial instability.  
 
In a more general work for the US economy, Buch, Eickmeier and Prieto (2014, a) investigate 
how different macroeconomic shocks are transmitted to banks in terms of affecting their 
(backward and forward looking) risk. These same authors, in Buch, Eickmeier and Prieto (2014, 
b), provide further empirical evidence regarding the bank risk taking channel of expansionary 
monetary policy, and the dissimilar responses observed across different types of banks. 
 
In all these stories, although several macroeconomic conditions might affect credit, house prices, 
and financial stability, the monetary policy aspect of the macroeconomic performance appears to 
be predominant for explaining how, during normal times, risks factors build up for financial 
intermediaries and the rest of economic agents. Other macroeconomic shocks that might also be 
relevant to explain excessive asset price growth and financial instability tend to be overlooked.  
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In a similar fashion, developing macro-prudential policies lean towards the use of tools to control 
excessive credit growth and leverage based on the assumption that credit and leverage surges 
tend to be negative phenomena for all time and places. However, the implementation of these 
policies still faces the difficulty of determining under which circumstances credit and leverage 
booms can indeed be negative. When we take a deeper and closer look at the interplay between 
leverage, risk and credit for particular countries, we may found – as we think it is the case for 
Venezuela – that the underlying dynamics may well depend on the nature of shocks affecting the 
economy, which may differ according to a variety of intuitional and policy settings. We consider 
that country studies such as this can help to disentangle the appropriate tools for mitigating 
banking risk.     
 
In this context, the objective of this paper is to empirically determine which macroeconomic 
conditions typify rising house prices and credit, and what ultimate factors compromise financial 
stability and risk. We do so by studying the impact of five major macroeconomic structural 
shocks (aggregate and sectorial) on house prices, portfolio allocation, stability, and performance 
indicators of the Venezuelan banking system. Since this paper is about normal times, we 
presume that the relevant shocks in the economy have a macroeconomic origin, and 
correspondingly we focus on the impact such shocks on the allocation of financial resources1. 
We also take into consideration the potential endogeneity among financial variables:  banking 
portfolio decisions can respond to asset prices, but portfolio decisions can also affect asset 
prices. For this reason, we implement an econometric approach that allows acknowledging 
endogeneity among a considerable number of variables, both macroeconomic and financial.  
 
The selection of structural shocks intends to fit a broad classification of shocks hitting 
economies, but also to capture the particular characteristics of the Venezuelan economy.  Besides 
an aggregate supply shock, we define four demand shocks, divided into aggregate and sectorial, 
to stress the fact that some shocks are borne in the aggregate goods market, while other shocks 
originate in specific sectors of the economy2. Two aggregate real demand shocks are 
differentiated according to their impact on the relative price of consumption or the relative price 
                                                 
1 Oppositely, works of Fornari and Stracca (2012), Eickmeier and Ng (2011), Hirstov et al. (2012) and Bagliano and 
Morana (2012) among others, have studied the global transmission of credit restrictions or financial shocks to the 
economic performance of countries. 
2  This classification is also equivalent to separating shocks according to the type of information used in their 
identification process. 
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of tradables3. Most of the literature acknowledges the existence of one real (fiscal) shock as 
opposed to a nominal (monetary) shock. We define two real shocks because we presume that 
changes in the relative consumption price might bring about important differences in the 
response of real production. On the other hand, we identify two structural sectorial shocks that 
emerge from the monetary and external sector respectively, and are more related to the particular 
institutional arrangement of the Venezuelan economy: a monetary and a durable surge shock. 
The monetary shock follows the identification in Chirinos and Pagliacci (2014) that proposes 
looking at money creation variables and deposit interest rates as key defining features of the 
shock4. The durable surge shock relates to the idea that, in an economy with exchange rate 
controls, that is, a dual exchange rate market with capital mobility restrictions, expectations of 
devaluation can precipitate an increase in the consumption and the price of durables goods. For 
this shock, a rising exchange rate premium (between the official and the non-official market 
rates) and a significant allocation of financial resources toward mortgages are crucial to 
characterize distress of the exchange rate system.  
 
There are already a couple of empirical works for the Venezuelan case that are directly related to 
this paper. For the housing market, Carvallo, Chirinos and Pagliacci (2012) claim that, due to 
changes in external conditions, a larger supply of loans to households has implied a greater 
banks’ exposure to housing loans and an increase in house prices. However, is it not clear 
whether other conditions not directly related to the external sector might also trigger movements 
in house price and banks’ exposure. On the other hand, in Chirinos and Pagliacci (2014), oil and 
monetary shocks, although similar from the macroeconomic point of view, induce differentiated 
banks’ portfolio allocations, and therefore, involve different types of risks. In particular, oil 
shocks have attached a strong liquidity effect that increases banks’ liabilities, and rises banks’ 
financing to firms and the government. For the monetary shock, households seem to receive a 
greater share of banks’ loans.  
 
At a methodological level, we use sign restrictions to identify the above five structural shocks in 
the context of a FAVAR model. The model specification combines observable general 
macroeconomic variables (real activity growth, inflation and the relative price of consumption) 
with unobservable factors that capture the common co-movements among micro-banking data 
                                                 
3 We use the price of goods in terms of services at the consumer level as a proxy for the relative price of tradables.  
4 In this case, the monetary shock does not address unanticipated changes in monetary policy actions but it refers to 
unanticipated changes in the primary money creation process driven by the fiscal authorities. 
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and other specific macroeconomic variables. The choice of this structure responds to both, the 
acknowledgement of the different endogeneity relationships already mentioned, and the 
application of a distinctive treatment for aggregate and sectorial shocks. In particular, using a 
block diagonal structure for the sign restriction identification, analogously as in Mumtaz and 
Surico (2009), we let shocks stemming from the goods market to have an immediate impact on 
all variables summarized trough the factors, but we compel sectorial shocks not to have an 
instant effect on the goods market. This is justifiable from the perspective that we are estimating 
endogenous relationships in normal times and not during crises, when, for instance, sectorial 
financial shocks might end up affecting the goods market immediately. In terms of the 
econometric setup and identification technique, our work is close to that Buch, Eickmeier and 
Prieto (2014, a). Nonetheless, it differs in two technical details regarding the implementation: the 
diagonal structure for the sign restriction identification and the estimation of factors5.   
 
At the individual bank level, we gather a total of 140 variables corresponding to 11 financial 
institutions that represent about 60% of the Venezuelan banking assets. This data mostly 
includes general performance indicators, exposures to different assets, two measures of financial 
stability, the median value of each variable and some aggregated banking indicators such as 
interest rates and the growth rate of assets. There are also nine sectorial macroeconomic 
variables that characterize the money creation process related to fiscal and foreign currency 
actions, the external sector, the housing market, bond yields and banks’ exposure to foreign debt. 
The analysis carried out along the paper is mostly based on the impulse responses of (aggregate 
and sectorial) macroeconomic variables and banking aggregated indicators to structural shocks. 
The heterogeneity of responses across banks will not be addressed in this paper.  
 
Regarding results, we develop a simple framework that allows us to systematically compare 
responses of relevant variables across shocks, in order to contrast our empirical evidence with 
other works in the literature. We find that real house prices basically respond to (aggregate and 
sectorial) demand shocks, but not to aggregate supply shocks. Most significant booms in real 
house prices occur simultaneously with increases in banks’ exposure to mortgages and real 
domestic currency depreciations. Monetary expansions from fiscal origin also cause increasing 
house prices. In terms of banking performance, we find that credit is directed toward firms for 
expansionary supply shocks, but toward household spending for expansionary demand shocks. In 
                                                 
5  A more detailed discussion on these two issues is presented in the next section. 
 6
all these cases, banking leverage increases, but mainly when shocks have a significant positive 
effect on output.  
 
Overall, risk appears to be related to a combination of macroeconomic and money market related 
factors. While expansionary supply shocks alleviate banking risk, contractionary sectorial shocks 
and expansionary aggregate real demand shocks increase it. For all these shocks, rising risk is 
associated to a real domestic currency appreciation and rising interest rates, which probably 
induce changes in the portfolio allocation of banks and increase the volatility of their returns. 
Also, in all these cases, a reduction of fiscal money creation and/or an increase of foreign 
currency liquidations take place, decreasing the net primary money creation in the economy. 
 
Our general interpretation is that credit growth or high banking leverage may precede financial 
distress because asset growth is probably a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for distress. 
The circumstances that indeed might increase the chances of a banking crisis are more probably 
related to the unexpected reduction of banking funds used to build up assets. Therefore, policy 
prescriptions in the direction of mitigating banks’ instability should evaluate the institutional or 
functional modifications that would stabilize banks’ funds. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the methodological strategy to 
identify structural shocks in the FAVAR. It also provides empirical and theoretical insights for 
the identification of shocks with reference to macroeconomic and institutional characteristics of 
the Venezuelan economy. Section III interprets identified aggregate shocks in terms of the 
overall performance of the economy. Section IV presents and analyzes results from the 
perspective of house prices and macroeconomic conditions, whereas section V does it by looking 
at financial performance, allocation decisions, and stability. Section VI summarizes the main 
messages of the paper. In order to focus on the identification of shocks and interpretation of 
results along the main body of the paper, the structure of the FAVAR and the technical details of 
the estimation are covered in appendix 1. However, it is advisable to check this appendix at this 
point, if the reader is not familiar either with the FAVAR or sign restriction literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 7
II. Identification of structural shocks and results 
 
This paper identifies five structural shocks, which can be classified into three general aggregate 
shocks and two specific sectorial shocks. Next, we will show the identification of shocks 
implemented, first for aggregate and then for sectorial shocks, and argue the reasons for the 
identifying assumptions.  
 
Aggregate shocks intend to disentangle all the fluctuations in the aggregate goods market, which 
are characterized by the behavior of real activity, general prices and the adjustments that operate 
in relative consumption prices. By definition, an expansionary aggregate supply shock 
propitiates an increase real activity and a reduction in inflation. On the contrary, expansionary 
aggregate demand shocks mostly increase prices, but may or may not have positive real effects. 
This division of shocks, simply in supply or demand shocks, constitutes a mean to summarize the 
impact of multiple shocks that might affect the economy. Similarly as argued by Blanchard and 
Quah (1989), identified aggregate supply and demand shocks can be interpreted as the net effect 
of many other shocks having a simultaneous impact on the goods market. This is opposed to the 
notion of identifying monetary policy, fiscal policy or productivity shocks, whose 
characterization already points out at the origin of macroeconomic fluctuations. In our case, the 
characterization of shocks intend to organize and rationalize all what is happening in the rest of 
the economy, say in the asset markets or  the banking sector.  
 
Besides this broad classification, we assume there are two types of real aggregate demand shocks 
that affect consumption patterns and relative prices: those increasing the consumption and 
relative price of goods (as a proxy for  tradables), and those increasing the consumption and 
relative price of services (as a proxy for  non-tradables). Since demand shocks might or might 
not have an immediate impact on real activity, the definition of these demand shocks uses 
exclusively general and relative price information. The summary of the restrictions imposed in 
the definition of shocks is presented in table 1.   
 
Table 1. - Restrictions imposed for identification of aggregate macroeconomic shocks 
 Expansionary 
Aggregate Supply 
Expansionary Demand 
in Tradables 
Expansionary 
Demand of Non Tradables 
Y +   
P - + + 
RCP  + - 
 Variables: Growth of real activity (Y), Inflation, measured as the growth of general consumer price 
index (P), Growth of relative consumption price: PT/PNT (RCP).  
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In the literature, Canova (2005) and others (such as Clarida and Gali 1994) typically identify one 
real demand shock instead of two. The presumption behind this more detailed taxonomy is that, 
in an oil abundant economy with the additional complication of exchange rate controls, 
consumption patterns and allocation of productive inputs can occur in a non standard fashion6. 
For example, given the exchange rate arrangement with dual markets, incentives to increase 
imports can induce a greater consumption of tradable goods and specialization in the 
commercialization of those goods. Therefore, after oil resources are directed into the domestic 
economy expanding aggregate demand, a greater consumption of tradables may have diverse 
real, banking or sectorial effects than a greater consumption of services. Therefore, we use the 
behavior of relative consumption prices to disentangle two potentially different real demand 
shocks7.  
 
As opposed to aggregate shocks, sectorial shocks refer to structural shocks that have its origin in 
more specific markets and do not necessarily have a defined effect on the aggregate goods 
market. Given the particular characteristics of the Venezuelan economy, we define a monetary 
and a durable surge shock. The summary of restrictions imposed on sectorial structural shocks is 
shown in table 2. Restrictions for all shocks are applied for six consecutive periods in order to 
characterize persistent enough structural shocks. 
  
The monetary shock, opposed to what is usually addressed in the literature, does not refer to a 
monetary policy shock, but to the way money is usually introduced in the economy. In 
Venezuela, a monetary expansion takes place when the public sector (the central government and 
the oil state company) spends external resources into the domestic economy and expands the 
quantity of deposits channeled by the financial system. Therefore, we characterize this shock 
according to the movements on the variables that define it, that is, the fiscal money creation and 
deposit interest rate variables, as proposed in Chirinos and Pagliacci (2014). As any monetary 
shock, a positive value represents an expansionary aggregate demand shock. Nonetheless, we do 
not impose any restriction on the expected response in the aggregate goods market in order to 
ponder the magnitude and timing of its impact. We presume that the single price that 
instantaneously responds to this shock is the nominal exchange rate in the non-official market, 
                                                 
6 In the framework of the Dutch disease, an increase in oil resources generates a growth of aggregate demand, a 
temporary positive effect on real activity, and a reduction in the relative price of tradables.  
7  Since in Venezuela price controls have mainly affected the behaviour of the price of services, the construction of 
the relative index of consumption prices uses de information of non-controlled services for the metropolitan area.  
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which is measured in units of domestic currency per dollar. Since the official exchange rate is 
fixed for most of the period, movements in the non-official market are measured in terms of the 
exchange rate premium between the official and non-official market.  
 
The second sectorial shock is referred as a durable surge and it addresses the fact that in an 
economy with an exchange rate control that fixes the official exchange rate, there are devaluation 
expectations that continuously emerge. Since these expectations are not directly observable, we 
need to define a set of conditions that indirectly portray the system distress. We do so by 
borrowing a variation of Calvo (1986) argument that expectations of collapse of a fixed 
exchange system precipitates the consumption of durable goods.  In this case, we presume that 
part of this consumption behavior is summarized by rising house prices. Finally, we complete 
this scenario assuming an increasing banking credit to the housing market and a larger exposure 
to mortgages by banks. In the overall, this shock can also be interpreted a surge in house prices 
that has its origin in external and banking conditions. The summary of restrictions imposed on 
sectorial structural shocks is available in table 2. Restrictions for all shocks are applied for six 
consecutive periods in order to characterize persistent enough structural shocks. 
 
Table 2.- Restrictions imposed for identification of sectorial macroeconomic shocks 
 Monetary shock Durable surge shock 
FM +  
TID -  
ERGAP + + 
RHP  + 
GMGL  + 
SMGL  + 
 Variables: fiscal money creation (FM); Implicit interest rate of liabilities (TID); Exchange rate premium 
(ERGAP); Growth of real house prices (RHP); Growth of aggregate mortgages (GMGL); Share of 
mortgages to total loans (SMGL). 
 
As already mentioned, the sign restriction identification compels the behavior of the restricted 
variables in their responses to structural shocks. In this paper, since we deal with a FAVAR, the 
implementation of the identification might not seem straightforward. A first element to consider 
is that, differently from Eickmeier and Hoffman (2013) and Buch et al. (2014, a), who also 
identify structural shocks with sign restrictions in a FAVAR, we do not clean factor estimates 
from their contemporaneous relationship with observable variables. This is so, because we do not 
attempt to interpret factor estimates nor have we imposed the recursive identification strategy 
followed by Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005). It is also the case, that it is precisely the 
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contemporaneous relationship between observable variables and factors what we want to 
preserve in order to analyze the impact of macroeconomic shocks on the rest of variables.  
 
A second element regarding the implementation of the sign restriction identification carried out 
in this paper is that specific or sectorial shocks cannot affect observable variables 
contemporaneously. In other words, shocks defined at the aggregate level could be pervasive in 
their effect on all variables, but when a shock is originated in specific markets or sectors, they 
cannot transmit right away (within the month) to the aggregate goods market. This notion is 
achieved by using a block diagonal structure in the rotation matrix that differentiates orthogonal 
from structural shocks, as is similarly done in Mumtaz and Surico (2009). In particular, 
aggregate shocks are identified only with the information coming from the three observable 
variables that characterize the goods market. On the contrary, identification of sectorial shocks 
uses all the information contained in the factors and consequently, it potentially exploits the 
entire common movements among the rest of variables. These two technical issues regarding 
sign restriction identification implementation are explained in appendix 1 in further detail. 
 
Results from impulse responses of variables to the above structural shocks are summarized in 
table 3. Impulse responses for the group of selected variables are available in appendix 2. List of 
variables in the FAVAR are in appendix 3. 
Table 3: Qualitative Summary of Impulse Responses to Different Shocks  
 
Block    /        Shock 
Expansionary Supply 
Shock 
Expansionary 
Tradable Demand 
Shock 
Expansionary  
Non Tradable 
Demand Shock  
Expansionary 
Monetary Shock 
Expansionary 
Durable Surge 
 
Restrictions 
Identification 
 
Increase in economic 
activity and reduction in 
general prices 
 
Increase in general prices 
and increase in relative 
consumption price 
 
Increase in general prices 
and decrease in relative 
consumption price 
 
Fiscal money creation 
and increase in foreign 
exchange rate premium 
 
Increase in foreign 
exchange premium and 
house prices with greater 
mortgage growth and 
exposure  
 
Macro variables 
 Lasting increase in 
aggregate activity 
and price reduction 
 
 
 
 Real domestic 
currency 
depreciation 
 
 Reduction in foreign 
exchange premium 
 
 Import surge 
 
 Fiscal money 
creation and raise in 
FX currency 
liquidation  (but 
positive net effect) 
 Lower domestic 
interest rates 
 
 Growth in aggregate 
loans and securities  
 
 Lower yield for 
foreign bonds 
 
 Increase in aggregate 
activity 
 
 
 
 
 Real domestic 
currency 
appreciation 
 
 Increase in foreign 
exchange premium 
 
 Import surge 
 
 Fiscal money 
contraction and raise 
in FX currency 
liquidation  (negative 
net effect) 
 Higher domestic 
interest rates 
 
 Growth in aggregate 
loans and contraction 
in securities 
 Higher yield for 
foreign bonds 
 No effect on 
aggregate activity 
 
 
 
 
 Real domestic 
currency 
appreciation 
 
 Reduction in foreign 
exchange premium 
 
 
 
 Raise in FX currency 
liquidation  (negative 
net effect) 
 
 
 Higher domestic 
interest rates 
 
 Contraction in 
securities 
 
 Transitory increase 
in activity and late 
price acceleration 
 Increase in the 
relative price of 
tradable goods  
 Real domestic 
currency 
depreciation 
 
 Increase in foreign 
exchange premium 
 
 Late increase in 
imports 
 Fiscal money 
creation and 
reduction in FX 
currency liquidation 
(positive net effect) 
 Lower domestic 
interest rates 
 
 Small growth in 
securities 
 
 Lower yield for 
foreign bonds 
 No effect on 
aggregate activity or 
general prices 
 Increase in the 
relative price of 
tradable goods 
 Real domestic 
currency 
depreciation after 5 
months 
 Lasting increase in 
foreign exchange 
premium 
 Small import 
reduction 
 Reduction in FX 
currency liquidation 
(positive net effect) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Small loan 
contraction 
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Banks’ Portfolio 
Allocation 
 Reallocation towards 
securities away from 
loans 
 
 Decrease in foreign 
bond share 
 
 Loan reallocation 
toward firms, away 
from consumers and 
mortgages 
 Reallocation toward 
loans away from 
securities  
 
 Decrease in foreign 
bond share 
 
 Loan reallocation 
toward consumers, 
away from firms and 
mortgages 
 Reallocation toward 
loans away from 
securities 
 
 
 
 
 Loan reallocation 
toward consumers, 
away from 
mortgages 
 No reallocation 
between loans and 
securities 
 
 
 
 
 Loan reallocation 
toward consumers 
and mortgages, away 
from firms 
 No reallocation 
between loans and 
securities  
 
 Increase in foreign 
bond share 
 
 Loan reallocation 
towards consumers 
and mortgages, away 
from firms 
Banks’ Performance  Increase in operating 
cost and interest 
margin 
 
 Decreased liquidity 
after 12 months 
 
 Increase in leverage 
after a year 
 
 
 Reduction in ROA 
volatility 
 Decrease in 
operating costs and 
increase in margin 
 
 Increased liquidity 
 
 
 Transitory increase 
in leverage 
 
 
 Increase in ROA 
volatility and 
probability of 
insolvency 
 Increase in operating 
costs 
 
 
 Immediate decreased 
liquidity that reverts 
after 12 months 
 Reduction in 
leverage after a year 
 
 
 Increase in ROA 
volatility and 
probability of 
insolvency 
 Decrease in 
operating cost and 
margin 
 
 
 
 
 Immediate increase 
in leverage 
 
 
 Decrease in ROA 
volatility and 
probability of 
insolvency 
 Decrease in 
operating cost and 
margin 
 
 
 
 
 Increase in leverage  
 
 
 
 Immediate decrease 
in ROA volatility 
and probability of 
insolvency (after 6 
months) 
Housing Market  Growth in mortgages 
and reduction in 
interest rates  (supply 
increase) 
 
 
 No significant effect 
on prices and 
increase in  number 
of transactions
 Contraction in 
mortgages and 
increase in interest 
rates (supply 
reduction) 
 
 Significant reduction 
in prices but increase 
in  number of 
transactions
 Contraction in 
mortgages and 
increase in interest 
rates (supply 
reduction) 
 
 Increase in prices 
after 12-month 
 
 Growth in mortgages 
and reduction in 
interest rates  (supply 
increase) 
 
 
 Transitory increase 
in prices and late 
increase in number 
of transactions
 Growth in mortgages 
and reduction in 
interest rates  (supply 
increase) 
 
 
 Increase in prices 
during a year 
 
III. Interpretation and comparisons of structural shocks 
 
The objective of this section is to get a qualitative overview of what is the overall economy 
performance for structural shocks, without discussing its effects on asset markets or the 
particular performance of banking indicators. These issues will be addressed in the following 
two sections. 
 
In the case of the aggregate supply shock, from the works of Bárcenas, Chirinos y Pagliacci 
(2013) and Chirinos and Pagliacci (2014), we know that it mostly refers to the occurrence of an 
oil boom in the context of an administrated policy of imports and exchange rate controls. That is, 
the combination of increased imports with a greater availability of oil resources has behaved as 
an expansionary aggregate supply shock, whose identification has been very robust to different 
models estimated for the 2004-2011 period. The novelty that the oil shock has consistently 
behaved as a supply shock (with increase in real activity and a reduction in inflation) rather than 
as a demand shock, has to do with the fact that imports have become a significant source of 
cheap intermediate inputs and consumption goods. In this scenario, notwithstanding its strong 
positive liquidity effect with diminishing interest rates, the nominal exchange rate in the non-
official market diminishes, but real domestic currency depreciation takes place8.        
 
In the case of the two real aggregate demand shocks identified, possible explanations regarding 
the factors that trigger them, and their sequencing in time, are more difficult to identify. Since 
both shocks are framed during expansions of the aggregate demand, and more precisely during 
expansions of aggregate consumption, the underlying causes of these shocks should be looked 
for in the factors that drive household consumption and/or saving decisions. These triggering 
factors might refer to all fiscal, monetary or exchange rate actions not summarized by the set of 
available variables in the FAVAR9.  
 
                                                 
8  The measure of real exchange rate constructed is simply proxy of a bilateral purchasing power with respect to 
USA, where the variations of the nominal exchange rate (Dom/$) in the non-official market is compared to the 
wedge of inflation rates between USA and Venezuela. In this case, real domestic currency depreciation is driven by 
the reduction in domestic inflation. 
9  In the Venezuelan case, it is likely that changes arising either in the administration of the exchange control regime 
and/or in the management of financial public assets and liabilities are particularly relevant. For instance, given the 
capital mobility restrictions associated to the control, in several opportunities the government allowed families to 
buy, with domestic currency, foreign denominated debt, which could be sold in international markets for foreign 
currency. This would refer to a case in which families reduce current consumption to increase savings in foreign 
currency, out of a policy action created in the context of the exchange rate control. 
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The comparison between these two expansionary real aggregate demand shocks shows that 
differences arise not only in the relative consumption price, but also in their effect on real 
activity, imports and the nominal exchange rate (exchange rate gap). In particular, it is 
interesting to note that only a positive shock to the consumption of goods, and not services, 
triggers a considerable increase in real output of non-tradable sectors. This presumably happens 
because the (non-tradable) sectors motorizing real activity are related to the commercialization 
of these (tradable) goods.  In this case, opposed to the Dutch disease type of prediction, a 
temporary real growth caused by an excessive aggregate demand occurs with an increase (not a 
reduction) in the relative price of tradables. While the rising demand of tradable goods induces 
an increase of the nominal exchange rate (in the non-official market) and an increase of imports, 
the other shock produces opposite results. Similarities between these two real demand shocks lie 
in the monetary aspect, where both shocks induce increasing interest rates. Also, both shocks are 
associated to real domestic currency appreciations, indicating that prices are augmenting more 
than proportionally with respect to the non-official nominal exchange rate.  
 
In terms of the two sectorial demand shocks, the main difference arises also in their effect on the 
aggregate goods market. While a positive monetary shock causes a temporary increase in real 
activity and a late response in inflation, a greater demand of durable goods does not have a 
statistical impact on either aggregate real activity or general prices10. Other differences are found 
in terms of interest rates and imports. While the monetary shock drives down all interest rates, 
including foreign bonds yields, the durable surge does not do so. Imports increase after a year for 
the monetary shock and shrink for the durable shock11.  
 
There are other differences among the identified structural shocks that are worthy of attention. 
For example, since the monetary shock is identified as an increase in fiscal money creation, 
which is ultimately related to the amount of oil resources that enter into the domestic economy, it 
could be asked  whether this shock is adequately separated from the supply shock (also related to 
oil booms). To answer that, it is important to understand that the real effect of the oil boom is 
associated to the availability of cheaper intermediate and consumption goods, while its monetary 
aspect materializes when the government domestically spends the local currency counterpart of 
                                                 
10  In the limit, looking at the median response of output and prices, the durable demand shock induces a response 
more similar to a contractionary supply shock than to an expansionary demand shock. 
11  Also, in terms of the foreign public bonds, a positive demand on durables increase the exposure of banks to these 
bonds, which can be related to the possible future slowdown in real activity. A comment on this regard will be made 
in the section addressing the behavior of foreign public debt yields. 
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such resources. These two events take place at different moments in time and reflect the 
particular monetary arrangement of the Venezuelan economy12. Also, although in both shocks 
the real domestic currency depreciates, in the supply shock this behavior is driven by the 
reduction of the inflation rate, while in the monetary shock occurs at the expense of huge 
nominal exchange rate escalation (in the non-official market). 
 
On the other hand, the expansionary tradable demand shock shares also some features with the 
positive monetary shock: while both shocks increase real activity, inflation and the relative price 
of tradables, the real shock pushes interest rates upward while the  monetary shock drives 
interest rates down. This is because these two shocks induce opposite effects on net money 
creation.  Also the behavior of real exchange rate and imports differs. 
 
Another valid comparison can be drawn between a positive durable demand shock and an 
expansionary demand of tradables, since most durable goods (except houses) are in fact 
tradables. As a matter of fact, in both cases the relative consumption price increases and the 
nominal (non-official) exchange rate  increases, but in one case as a consequence of a greater 
demand of tradable goods, in the other case as the origin of the demand of durables (the 
expectations of devaluation or external distress). Therefore, while for the tradable shock this 
greater demand turns into a positive real effect (with more available imported goods), in the 
durable surge only relative prices adjust. The diverse origin of shocks also translates into a 
divergent pattern for the real exchange rate movements. At the level of the housing market, the 
behavior of prices is radically the opposite.   
 
Finally, a word of caution for interpreting results. Since explanations of asset markets or banking 
performance indicators sometimes involve referring to the mirror images of identified shocks, 
the reader needs to be careful with the direction of shocks addressed in different parts of the text. 
For instance, in the case of contractionary real demand shocks we would be referring to the case 
of falling aggregate demand with a reallocation of consumption away from the corresponding 
sector. 
  
 
 
                                                 
12  This refers to the fact that the oil company must sell an important part of oil resources to the Central Bank in 
exchange for domestic currency. 
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IV. Real house prices and macroeconomic conditions 
 
Which macroeconomic conditions explain rising real house prices? Which are the 
macroeconomic shocks that mostly affect this price? What is the role played by housing credit? 
Are real domestic currency appreciations and higher leverage common conditions surrounding 
rising real house prices?  
 
The previous questions can be addressed by the impulse responses already obtained, but focusing 
on the direction of structural shocks that move house prices in the same direction. In table 4, we 
summarize the direction of other variables’ impulse responses, for the shocks that portray rising 
house prices. Partial associations between house prices and other variables emerge when 
directions of responses are mostly identical. 
 
Table 4. Variables responses for shocks with rising real house prices  
 
Shock RHP NHT GMGL TMGL SMGL LEV RCP RER ERGAP Y 
↓ DT + - + - + - - + - - 
↑ M + + + - + + + + + + 
↑ DS + ... + - + +  + + + ... 
↑ DNT + ... - + - -  - - - ... 
Shocks: Demand of tradable goods (DT); Demand of non-tradable goods (DNT); Monetary (M); Durable 
surge (DS). Arrows indicate if the shock is expansionary (up) or contractionary (down). 
Variables: Growth of real house prices (RHP); Number of house transactions (NHT); Growth of aggregate 
mortgages (GMGL); Interest rate of mortgages (TMGL); Share of mortgages to total loans (SMGL); Banking 
leverage (LEV); Growth of relative consumption price: PT/PNT (RCP); Growth of real exchange rate (RER); 
Exchange rate premium (ERGAP); Growth of real activity (Y). 
 
 
The first general assessment is that the number of transactions in this market (NHT), and 
therefore, the sales of houses, seems to be positively related with movements in real activity13. 
Secondly, house prices basically change with expansionary or contractionary demand shocks, but 
not with aggregate supply shocks that potentially increase also the supply of houses.  
 
Rising house prices mostly occur when demand of durables (↑DS), non-tradable (↑DNT) and in 
general, all goods and services (↑M) increase. This happens simultaneously as real activity does 
not contract (either stays the same or increases).  Nonetheless, it is initially striking that when the 
demand of tradable goods is shrinking (↓DT), house prices boost, as it points out the information 
in table 4.  
                                                 
13  The number of house transactions also increase during expansionary supply shocks, but without affecting their 
price. 
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Possible explanations of these different evidences are advanced next. When a contractionary 
tradable shock occurs (↓DT), aggregate demand is falling, but a redistribution of demand toward 
non-tradable goods is also operating. This justifies an increasing demand in the housing market. 
At a more specific level, house prices also rise because, while a temporary reduction in the 
availability of houses for sale operates (↓NHT), at bank level, funds are directed to the housing 
market. So, the increase in housing mortgages and a reduction in mortgage interest rates enable 
few acquisitions of houses at higher prices. Since real domestic currency depreciates during this 
shock, also there is a possible positive pass through to some housing segments.    
  
For an expansionary monetary shock (↑M), in which the money creation is mainly driven by 
fiscal decisions, excess money supply in hands of families would boost the demand of mainly 
(tradable) goods, foreign denominated assets, and houses. Simultaneously, the allocation of 
financial funds, first toward consumption loans and second, toward mortgages, explains the 
possibility that families lift potential liquidity constraints and materialize their demand in rising 
house prices14. For the non-tradable shock (expansionary DNT), the greater demand of services 
does not translate into a positive boost in real activity, but potentially increases the demand for 
houses (also a non tradable). In this case, the reduction in the supply of mortgages and a 
reallocation toward consumption loans lag the increase house prices, which occurs almost after a 
year. In this last case, a real domestic currency appreciation occurs. This particular scenario is 
consistent with findings in Carvallo, Chirinos and Pagliacci (2012) where some situations of real 
domestic currency appreciation and no movements in real activity lead to rising house prices. 
 
Another important shock that explains growing house prices is a surge in durable goods (↑DS). 
In this case, by construction, expectations devaluations and a greater allocation of financial funds 
to the housing market are the triggering factors for such demand. In particular, houses might 
represent a mean to avoid wealth losses, as nominal and real domestic currency depreciation 
takes place. This depreciation can also signal a possible pass through to some housing segments. 
 
Now, from all these different macroeconomic situations, which are the variable associations that 
emerge? The first most remarkable result is that, for shocks explaining the largest variance of 
real house prices (all but expansionary DNT), the financial system is directing resources toward 
                                                 
14 In terms of the positive correlation that emerges between a monetary easing and rising real house prices, this 
result is comparable to the ones referring in the literature to the role of monetary policy in promoting housing 
booms. However, it is distinctive from the perspective that fiscal actions, and not monetary policy actions, are the 
ones determining the monetary stance of the economy. 
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the housing market. Although we cannot state that this reallocation of funds is the ultimate cause 
for increasing house prices, it obviously is an important element in the transmission 
mechanism15. Less likely, growing house prices can also occur, in absence of larger mortgage 
exposure and leverage, as it is the case for a expansionary DNT. Therefore, reallocation of funds 
to the real estate market can be considered an amplifying factor for rising house prices.  
 
Secondly, most cases when real house prices boost a simultaneous real domestic currency 
depreciation. Since by definition, structural shocks are the ultimate cause for both, rising real 
house prices and real exchange rate, we cannot establish a direct causality between these two 
variables. However, we can state that real domestic currency depreciation potentially intensifies 
rising real house prices as it signals higher nominal prices for most expensive housing segments. 
    
Finally, real output growth does not seem to be a necessary condition for increasing house prices. 
On the contrary, in some analyzed cases, it is the reduction in real activity a characteristic 
accompanying rising real house prices. Aggregate supply shocks, which mostly affect output, do 
not have a statistical significant effect on house prices. 
 
V. Financial system performance 
 
V.1 Banks’ portfolio allocation  
 
Identified shocks imply differentiated movements in the allocation of resources between 
different asset classes. While the expansionary supply shock tends to increase the share of 
securities (mostly public debt bonds), the two real aggregate demand shocks, on the other hand, 
reduce the share of securities and increase the relative weight of loans. The other two sectorial 
shocks, the monetary and durable surge shocks, have no distributional effect at this level, but 
imply a reallocation of funds within types of loans. Independently of these patterns, 
expansionary shocks (except for expansionary DNT) increase banking leverage, especially when 
shocks have a positive impact on real activity. 
 
Regarding allocation between loan classes, an expansionary supply shock tends to assign credit 
to firms, reducing the portfolio share of consumer and housing loans. Oppositely, all identified 
                                                 
15 This result is also consistent with findings in Carvallo, Chirinos and Pagliacci (2012), in which shocks increasing 
the supply of mortgages are followed by a growth in real house prices.  
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demand shocks (including the durable surge shock) imply a movement away from loans to firms 
and toward asset classes related to household spending (on consumption goods or houses). To be 
noticed, similar loan allocation effects are established by Chirinos and Pagliacci (2014) where an 
expansionary oil shock (equivalent to a positive supply shock) favors credit to the corporate 
sector, whereas a monetary shock inclines banks towards consumer and housing-related lending. 
Our results extend those findings, by identifying more comprehensive shocks. 
 
A general explanation for these loan allocation patterns could be that the financial system adjusts 
its supply of funds to the credit demand of agents motorizing, either production (in the supply 
shock) or houselhold spending (for the rest of shocks). Nonetheless, loan interest rate movements 
are not always upward, indicating that other factors (not related to credit demand behavior) 
might affect banks’ decisions to allocate funds. For instance, for the aggregate supply shock, 
where loan interest rates tend to decline, lending to firms could be a combination of a greater 
availability of deposits and the selection of agents perceiving higher rents16.  
 
The previous trends in assets allocation are also likely to leave a mark upon the sources of latent 
risk. For example, an increasing allocation of funds to the public sector during expansionary 
supply shocks could increase banks’ risk in scenarios of oil price reductions and government 
insolvency (Chirinos and Pagliacci 2014, Moreno and Pagliacci 2011). Less clear is the risk 
effect of portfolio reallocation between types of loans for demand shocks, but increasing the 
share of credit to households could materialize in increasing risk, if during economic 
contractions households end up with a worse performance than firms.  
 
V.2 Banks’ instability and risk  
 
There are several forms to measure risk in the literature. Some authors use the ratio of non-
performing loans, such as Buch et. al (2010), others refer to leverage or the share of consumer 
credit and mortgages to total assets such as Angeloni et. al (2010). Many others make use of 
market based metrics of probability of default in the line with Merton (1973) or recur to the 
computation of Z-scores. For the measurement of banks’ risk, we rely on two measures widely 
used in the literature: Z-scores and the cross-sectional standard deviations of returns on assets 
(see Buch, Eickmeir and Prieto 2014, a). The Z-score measure is calculated using banking data 
                                                 
16  In fact, since expansionary supply shocks are related to positive oils shocks with increasing imports at the official 
exchange rate, the government and firms are the ones receiving the greater share of the oil rent.   
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on capitalization, returns and its volatility17. Theoretically speaking, Z-scores are inversely 
related to the probability of insolvency, i.e. the probability that the equity base of the bank will 
be sufficiently eroded to render the bank insolvent. Therefore, lower values indicate- a greater 
probability of insolvency. The second measure, the cross-sectional standard deviations of returns 
on assets, tries to capture systemic volatility of returns and seem to closely anticipate periods of 
financial tension. 
 
Table 5 shows the response of the two selected measures of risk and other related variables for 
shocks with increasing risk: higher volatility of cross-sectional rates of returns and an increase in 
the probabilities of insolvency (lower Z-scores). 
 
Table 5: Variables responses for shocks with increasing risk 
 
Shock ROADEV ZETA LEV RHP TIL GLOANS SLOANS RER ERGAP RCP
 ↑DT + - + - + + + - + + 
 ↓AS + - - … + - + - + … 
 ↓M + - - - + … … - - - 
 ↓DS + - - - … + … - - - 
↑DNT + - - + + … + - - - 
Shocks: Aggregate supply (AS); Demand of tradable goods (DT); Demand of non-tradable goods (DNT); 
Monetary expansion (M); Durable surge (DS). Arrows indicate if the shock is expansionary (up) or 
contractionary (down). 
Variables: Standard deviation of ROA (ROADEV); Z-score (ZETA); Banking leverage (LEV); Implicit interest 
rate of loans (TIL); Growth of aggregate banks’ loans (GLOANS); Share of total loans to total assets 
(SLOANS); Growth of real exchange rate (RER); Exchange rate premium (ERGAP); Growth of relative 
consumption price (RCP). 
 
 
For all types of shocks associated with increasing risk, the local currency is experiencing real 
appreciation. Also, both the yield on foreign currency denominated bonds and domestic interest 
rates are increasing.  
 
There is also an extensive literature on the association between the level of interest rates and 
risk18. In adverse selection models such as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), high loan interest rates are 
associated with increasing risk because the average pool quality of borrowers’ projects lowers, 
although lenders’ benefits rise. On the other hand, in recent contributions, Cociuba et. al (2012), 
and Malherbe (2012) develop DSGE models in which low interest rates increase risk in the 
                                                 
17 Returns volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of ROA over a moving twelve month window.  
18 Some models of asymmetric information and interest rate are: Townsend (1979), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
Diamong and Dybvig (1983), Diamond (1984), Bernanke and Gertler (1987), Milde and Riley (1988), Jaffe and 
Stiglitz (1990), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).  
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context of deposit insurance and limited liability19. Likewise, if episodes of low real and nominal 
interest rates are prolonged, banks’ managers have incentives to search for higher yields by 
taking more risk. When these low interest rates are the result of persistent monetary 
accommodations, it operates what is called the “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy (see 
Angeloni et. al 2010, Angeloni and Faia 2009). 
 
Regarding the role of domestic currency appreciation as a triggering factor for financial 
instability, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Gourinchas et al. (2001), and Gourinchas and 
Obstfeld (2012) have established substantial international evidence. Nonetheless, the underlying 
microfoundations of the effect domestic currency appreciation on risk have not been well 
established. Bruno and Shin (2013), in a model in which banks intermediate dollar denominated 
funds, stipulate that, by virtue of domestic currency appreciation, local borrower´s project values 
(in dollars) increase, so banks tend to augment leverage, facing higher potential future risks. 
 
Although this extensive literature might provide general arguments to rationalize our empirical 
results, given the particular characteristics of the Venezuelan economy, some work needs to be 
done to provide a reasonable story. In the first place, domestic currency appreciation does not 
necessarily addresses a strong signal of external vulnerability, given that real exchange rate 
movements are measured in the non-official market, where the value of the domestic currency 
adjusts to supply and demand conditions. What we do observe, is that for all shocks, real 
domestic currency appreciation occurs simultaneously with a reduction of fiscal creation and/or 
an increase of foreign currency liquidations, both of which decrease net money creation and 
shape a general upward tendency for interest rates. This primary monetary tightening has 
induced, in some cases, a reduction of the nominal exchange rate (ERGAP), and in the rest of 
cases, a growth rate smaller than domestic inflation. This combination of rising interest rates and 
lowered real exchange rates provides incentives for the financial system to re-arrange their 
portfolio allocation. In most of these scenarios, the share of loans to assets tends to increase, and 
redistribution occurs liquidating public debt security positions while intermediating more funds 
to the private sector through loans. In this process, profits suddenly change in time and become 
                                                 
19  In those moral hazard models, deposit insurance lowers bank´s marginal cost of funding bellow its social cost. 
Banks have incentives to take projects with socially negative NPV, as limited liability allows benefiting from risky 
projects going well while being partially shielded from risky projects going bad. 
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uneven for banks, reflecting increasing risk in terms of both, time volatility of banks’ returns and 
cross section volatility of systemic returns20.      
 
At the light of previous results, a fundamental question arises: what is triggering the emergence 
of banking risk? One view in the literature, such as in Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012), is that 
increasing banking leverage is the ultimate cause of systemic risk, since during leverage build up 
banks tend to assume more risk in their investments and borrowers’ profiles. Later, during 
situations of financial stress, as risk materializes, leverage tends to decrease as asset crunch 
unravels. Our results might support this view, since, for most shocks, higher risk is associated 
with a process of de-leveraging and falling house prices, while during times of relative financial 
stability, leverage and house prices tend to rise (table 5).  
 
Nevertheless, it would seem that the role played by monetary conditions, which are mainly 
resumed by the primary money creation conditions, is fundamental for triggering risk. In our 
case, the circumstances that indeed might increase the chances of a crisis are more probably 
related to the unexpected reduction of banking funds used to build up assets, given a previous 
situation of growing leverage. That is, a potential sudden reduction of banks’ funds constitutes 
the ultimate cause of increasing banking risk. Reallocation of assets also takes place because 
there probably are price mechanisms at work through exchange rate and interest rate 
adjustments. So, our interpretation is that credit growth or high banking leverage may precede 
financial distress because asset growth is probably a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for 
distress. 
 
This theoretical stand has already been taken in the literature, for instance in Perotti and Suarez 
(2011), which argues that the root of banks’ risk lies in the quality of funding: wholesale funding 
is cheaper but unstable. In our case, the instability of funds has its roots in the volatility of net 
primary money creation and in the institutional arrangement that allows that fiscal and exchange 
rate actions modify the quantity of primary money in the economy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
20  Although not shown in the impulse responses, ROA does not show a defined pattern with respect to the behavior 
of Z-scores and might increase or decrease depending on the shock considered. However, risk adjusted returns 
decrease, indicating that Z-scores are mainly driven by the behavior of volatility of returns. 
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VI. Final summary 
 
The objective of this paper is to determine which macroeconomic conditions typify rising asset 
prices and what ultimate factors compromise financial stability and risk. Methodologically, we 
have accomplished this objective by defining meaningful structural macroeconomic shocks that 
affect asset prices and banking performance indicators. Specific results emerge by addressing 
partial variable associations that come out across shocks. This allows interpreting results in 
comparison with the related academic literature. 
 
Of the two assets analyzed, we find that real house prices basically respond to expansionary or 
contractionary aggregate and sectorial demand shocks. For shocks explaining the largest 
variance of real house prices, the financial system directs resources toward mortgages. Although 
we cannot state that this reallocation of funds is the ultimate cause for increasing house prices, it 
probably represents an amplifying factor for it. Secondly, since for most cases real house prices 
boost simultaneously with real domestic currency depreciations, we believe that a real 
depreciation also magnifies rising real house prices, as it signals higher nominal prices for most 
expensive housing segments. Finally, while a great deal of academic literature provide evidence 
on the positive effect of a loose monetary policy on house prices, our results show that a fiscal 
monetary expansion also causes increasing house prices.  
 
Among the most significant results for banking performance, we find that for expansionary 
supply shocks the allocation of financial credit is directed toward firms, and for expansionary 
demand shocks, toward household spending on housing and/or goods and services. In all these 
cases, leverage increases, but mainly when these expansionary shocks have a significant positive 
effect on output. Rising risk and financial instability stem from the combination of rising interest 
rates and a lowered real exchange rate, two conditions that provide incentives for re-arranging 
portfolio allocation. Redistribution of funds occurs by liquidating public debt security positions 
and the intermediation of funds to firms or households through loans. However, we believe that 
the reduction of banking funds that operates during all these shocks is an important factor for 
increasing risk. Regarding to existing literature, risk is defined in different ways and 
comparisons are not straightforward.  
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In Venezuela, since the instability of funds has its roots in the volatility of net primary money 
creation, it seems necessary to adjust the institutional arrangement that regulates the quantity of 
primary money in the economy. Therefore, policy prescriptions in the direction of mitigating 
banks’ instability should evaluate the institutional or functional modifications that would 
stabilize banks’ funds. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Structure of the model 
 
Consider the following system: 
ttt FX         (1) 
tqtqtt uZZZ   ...111      (2) 
 
The first equation refers to a factor model, in which sectorial macroeconomic and banking 
variables X are function of a set of non-observable factors F, through the factor loadings Λ. By 
construction X has time dimension T and N variables, being N>T.  For this investigation N=149 
(140 banking variables plus 9 sectorial variables) and T=96 (monthly observations from January 
2004 through December 2011). 
 
The second equation represents a structural VAR where Z includes observable macroeconomic 
variables Y and factors F, such that 


F
Y
Z  with observable variables stacked first. Structural 
shocks are represented by u and have a diagonal covariance matrix.  B and    are structural 
VAR parameters. This second equation can also be written as a reduced VAR, such that: 
  
ttt eZZ  1      (3)    
where A is the companion matrix form that translates any VAR(q) into a VAR(1). Reduced form 
residuals e have covariance matrix  . 
 
Equation (1) and (3) constitute the FAVAR model. Since N>T, factors can be estimated through 
principal component analysis, and can be considered as observable for estimating equation (3). 
Equation (3) is estimated by OLS as any VAR. This implies that the estimation of the FAVAR is 
carried out in two stages and that uncertainty of factors is considered negligible, as in Bernanke, 
Boivin and  Eliasz (BBE, 2005). The order of VAR is selected looking at Schwarz and Hannan-
Quinn criteria, which suggest the use of 1 lag. Stability conditions of the VAR are also satisfied.  
 
The number of factors included in the VAR is determined qualitatively: including the minimum 
number of factors that produce stable impulse responses, but avoiding an excessive volatility as 
the number of factor increases. Tests, such as the ones proposed by Bai and Ng (2002), were also 
applied, providing a range between 5 and 8 factors as the optimal number of factors. We finally 
chose the first 5 principal components of X as the relevant factors to be included in the 
estimation of equation (3). This makes Z a vector of 8 variables. 
 
Sign restriction identification 
 
This type of identification starts by finding a set of orthogonal errors in the estimated VAR 
according to (3). Through any orthogonalization process, that is, any matrix decomposition that 
satisfies 'ˆˆˆ VV , orthogonal errors can be retrieved with the expression tt eV 1ˆ  . In 
particular, we obtain Vˆ  from the Cholesky decomposition of ˆ .  Because structural shocks are 
strictly identified by their expected effect on economic variables, orthogonal shocks may not 
necessarily qualify as such. Therefore, the way sign restriction identification works is by 
combining orthogonal shocks in such a way that the resulting structural (also orthogonal) shocks 
have the properties imposed by the researcher. Operationally, if we assume that structural shocks 
 28
are related to orthogonal shocks through a matrix Q , such that tt uQ  then, we can write 
structural impulse responses from the VAR as   QVhZRI h ˆˆˆ 1  for the hth horizon. However, 
Q  must be a rotation matrix, which by definition satisfies QQ' , so that we can always write 
'ˆˆ'ˆ'ˆˆ VVVQQV  . That is, the properties of the estimated covariance matrix are preserved. 
According to Rubio, Waggoner and Zha (2010), Q can be obtained from applying the QR 
decomposition to a uniform random matrix. For a FAVAR, since factors cannot be interpreted, 
impulse responses on final variables are given by  hIRY  and    hIRFhIRX  , where 
 hIRY  and  hIRF  come from the partition of     


hIRF
hIRY
hZRI ˆ  and Λ are the eigenvectors 
associated to the selected factors. Therefore, sign restriction identification consists on finding 
several (enough) rotation matrices Qs that satisfy the restrictions imposed on impulse responses 
of final variables21. Notice that this procedure avoids imposing null restrictions on B, as it is the 
case when using Cholesky decomposition as a structural identification scheme. In other words, 
QVˆ  does not generally exhibits zero restrictions, as it does Vˆ .  
 
Since we want to identify aggregate and sectorial structural shocks, we impose differences on the 
way these shocks are defined and their impact on the rest of the economy. For instance, 
aggregate shocks are strictly identified with the information coming from the aggregate goods 
market. Specific or sectorial shocks, on the contrary, have its origin in more specific markets and 
do not necessarily have a defined effect on the aggregate goods market. In terms of their 
relationship with the rest of the economy, aggregate structural shocks have an immediate impact 
on all variables, but sectorial shocks do not have an instant effect on the goods market. These 
two sets of assumptions are imposed by assuming a block diagonal form to matrix Q, such that 



2
1
0
0
Q
Q
. Notice that the non-zero blocks of Q, say Q1 and Q2 , also satisfy 11 'QQ  and 
22 'QQ , and Q can still be defined as a rotation matrix.. Since the goods market is 
characterized by three observable variables in the FAVAR, for our model, Q1 is a 3x3 matrix and 
Q2 is a 5x5 matrix. The use of this block diagonal structure for Q is a generalization of the 
procedure used in Mumtaz and Surico (2009), which define Q as 


I
Q
0
01 , i.e. the combination 
of a rotation matrix with an identity matrix, in order to distinguish international from domestic 
shocks, in a FAVAR for UK augmented with international factors.  
 
Compared to a recursive identification scheme, the identification achieved with a block diagonal 
structure of  Q  has a couple of advantages. First, although the impact matrix QVˆ   has a block of 
zeros, these zero restrictions are located only its upper-right hand side corner and are fewer in 
number than those appearing in a recursive identification scheme. Second, the greatest gain to 
the use of this block diagonal structure is that different types of shocks combine information 
from diverse groups of variables, differentiating the set of information that characterize each 
type. This makes impact of shocks more powerful and still allows defining shocks in terms of co-
movements of several (not one) variables.  
 
 
                                                 
21  For each potential draw of Q that generates impulse responses, identification entails to keeps only those draws 
that satisfy restrictions imposed, but for all identified shocks simultaneously. This is so in order to preserve 
orthogonality among structural shocks.  
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Given the importance of the work of BBE (2005) in the FAVAR literature, it is important to 
comment on the differences that arise in terms of the general identification strategy used in this 
paper. BBE (2005) apply a recursive identification scheme by two means: using the Cholesky 
decomposition on a VAR where factors are ordered first than the observable interest rate 
variable, and ensuring that the recursive identification scheme is empirically satisfied. This last 
condition entails removing the contemporaneous effect of interest rate on factors, which is done 
by regressing estimated factors against “slow moving factors” and the interest rate22. They also 
dedicate some effort to explain which factors can be considered slow movement. All this is done 
because a shock to the interest rate must not affect factors contemporaneously. When using sign 
restrictions, identification is achieved by addressing the behavior of observed variables and 
factors are only instruments to summarize other variables’ co-movements. Therefore, we do not 
clean factor estimates from their contemporaneous relationship with observable variables 
because we are not imposing a recursive identification scheme and it is precisely the 
contemporaneous relationships between observable variables and factors what we want to 
preserve in order to adequately ponder the impact of macroeconomic shocks. Although 
Eickmeier and Hoffman (2013) and Buch et al. (2014, a) also identify structural shocks with sign 
restrictions in a FAVAR closer in spirit to our model than to the BBE FAVAR, they do clean 
factors from observable variables. It is our belief that this procedure is not justified given the 
reasons already mentioned. 
                                                 
22  Boivin, Giannoni and Mihov (2009) suggest instead an iterative procedure to eliminate the effect of the 
observable variable on factors.  
 Appendix 2 
1.1. Expansionary aggregate supply shock: macroeconomic performance 
 
 
       
 
Impulse responses are accumulated and expressed in standardize units for all variables, except for observable variables, which are expressed in percentage points. The lines in 
impulse responses represent the 84th, 50th and 16th percentiles respectively of all impulse responses satisfying sign restrictions imposed.   
Variables: Growth of real activity indicator (Y), Growth of general consumer price index (P), Growth of relative consumption price: price of tradables/price of non-tradables 
(RCP), Growth of  real exchange rate (RER), Exchange rate gap (ERGAP), Money creation of fiscal origin to money base (FM), Foreign currency liquidations to money base 
(FCLQ), Growth of foreign currency value of private imports (IM), Implicit interest rate of liabilities (TID), Implicit interest rate of loans (TIL), Yield of foreign public bonds 
(YIELDFB), Growth of aggregate banks’ loans (GLOANS), Growth of aggregate banks’ securities (GSEC). 
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1.2. Expansionary aggregate supply shock: banks’ performance and housing market 
 
 
 
Impulse responses are accumulated and expressed in standardize units for all 
variables, except for observable variables, which are expressed in percentage 
points. The lines in impulse responses represent the 84th, 50th and 16th percentiles 
respectively of all impulse responses satisfying sign restrictions imposed.   
Variables: Share of total loans to total assets (SLOANS), Share of loans to firms 
to total loans (SCML), Share of consumer loans to total loans (SCNL), Share of 
mortgages to total loans (SMGL), Share of total securities to total assets (SSEC), 
Share of foreign public bonds to total public debt (SFBONDS), Operating costs / 
total assets (OCOSTS), Net interest margin (NIM), Liquid assets to customer & 
short term liabilities (LIQ), Leverage: total assets to equity (LEV), 
(ROA+capitalization)/time deviation of ROA (ZETA), ROA cross-sectional 
standard deviation (ROADEV), Growth of aggregate mortgages (GMGL), Interest 
rate of mortgages (TMGL), Growth of real house prices (RHP), Number of house 
transactions (NHT). 
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2.1. Expansionary tradable demand shock: macroeconomic performance 
 
      
 
 
 
Impulse responses are accumulated and expressed in standardize units for all variables, except for observable variables, which are expressed in percentage points. The lines in 
impulse responses represent the 84th, 50th and 16th percentiles respectively of all impulse responses satisfying sign restrictions imposed.   
Variables: Growth of real activity indicator (Y), Growth of general consumer price index (P), Growth of relative consumption price: price of tradables/price of non-tradables 
(RCP), Growth of  real exchange rate (RER), Exchange rate gap (ERGAP), Money creation of fiscal origin to money base (FM), Foreign currency liquidations to money base 
(FCLQ), Growth of foreign currency value of private imports (IM), Implicit interest rate of liabilities (TID), Implicit interest rate of loans (TIL), Yield of foreign public bonds 
(YIELDFB), Growth of aggregate banks’ loans (GLOANS), Growth of aggregate banks’ securities (GSEC). 
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2.2. Expansionary tradable demand shock: banks’ performance and housing market 
 
          
     
Impulse responses are accumulated and expressed in standardize units for all 
variables, except for observable variables, which are expressed in percentage 
points. The lines in impulse responses represent the 84th, 50th and 16th percentiles 
respectively of all impulse responses satisfying sign restrictions imposed.   
Variables: Share of total loans to total assets (SLOANS), Share of loans to firms 
to total loans (SCML), Share of consumer loans to total loans (SCNL), Share of 
mortgages to total loans (SMGL), Share of total securities to total assets (SSEC), 
Share of foreign public bonds to total public debt (SFBONDS), Operating costs / 
total assets (OCOSTS), Net interest margin (NIM), Liquid assets to customer & 
short term liabilities (LIQ), Leverage: total assets to equity (LEV), 
(ROA+capitalization)/time deviation of ROA (ZETA), ROA cross-sectional 
standard deviation (ROADEV), Growth of aggregate mortgages (GMGL), Interest 
rate of mortgages (TMGL), Growth of real house prices (RHP), Number of house 
transactions (NHT). 
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3.1. Expansionary non-tradable demand shock: macroeconomic performance  
 
 
       
 
 
Impulse responses are accumulated and expressed in standardize units for all variables, except for observable variables, which are expressed in percentage points. The lines in 
impulse responses represent the 84th, 50th and 16th percentiles respectively of all impulse responses satisfying sign restrictions imposed.   
Variables: Growth of real activity indicator (Y), Growth of general consumer price index (P), Growth of relative consumption price: price of tradables/price of non-tradables 
(RCP), Growth of  real exchange rate (RER), Exchange rate gap (ERGAP), Money creation of fiscal origin to money base (FM), Foreign currency liquidations to money base 
(FCLQ), Growth of foreign currency value of private imports (IM), Implicit interest rate of liabilities (TID), Implicit interest rate of loans (TIL), Yield of foreign public bonds 
(YIELDFB), Growth of aggregate banks’ loans (GLOANS), Growth of aggregate banks’ securities (GSEC). 
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3.2. Expansionary non-tradable demand shock: banks’ performance and housing market 
 
        
 
Impulse responses are accumulated and expressed in standardize units for all 
variables, except for observable variables, which are expressed in percentage 
points. The lines in impulse responses represent the 84th, 50th and 16th percentiles 
respectively of all impulse responses satisfying sign restrictions imposed.   
Variables: Share of total loans to total assets (SLOANS), Share of loans to firms 
to total loans (SCML), Share of consumer loans to total loans (SCNL), Share of 
mortgages to total loans (SMGL), Share of total securities to total assets (SSEC), 
Share of foreign public bonds to total public debt (SFBONDS), Operating costs / 
total assets (OCOSTS), Net interest margin (NIM), Liquid assets to customer & 
short term liabilities (LIQ), Leverage: total assets to equity (LEV), 
(ROA+capitalization)/time deviation of ROA (ZETA), ROA cross-sectional 
standard deviation (ROADEV), Growth of aggregate mortgages (GMGL), Interest 
rate of mortgages (TMGL), Growth of real house prices (RHP), Number of house 
transactions (NHT). 
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4.1. Expansionary monetary shock: macroeconomic performance  
 
 
         
 
 
Impulse responses are accumulated and expressed in standardize units for all variables, except for observable variables, which are expressed in percentage points. The lines in 
impulse responses represent the 84th, 50th and 16th percentiles respectively of all impulse responses satisfying sign restrictions imposed.   
Variables: Growth of real activity indicator (Y), Growth of general consumer price index (P), Growth of relative consumption price: price of tradables/price of non-tradables 
(RCP), Growth of  real exchange rate (RER), Exchange rate gap (ERGAP), Money creation of fiscal origin to money base (FM), Foreign currency liquidations to money base 
(FCLQ), Growth of foreign currency value of private imports (IM), Implicit interest rate of liabilities (TID), Implicit interest rate of loans (TIL), Yield of foreign public bonds 
(YIELDFB), Growth of aggregate banks’ loans (GLOANS), Growth of aggregate banks’ securities (GSEC). 
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4.2. Expansionary monetary shock: banks’ performance and housing market 
 
       
 
Impulse responses are accumulated and expressed in standardize units for all 
variables, except for observable variables, which are expressed in percentage 
points. The lines in impulse responses represent the 84th, 50th and 16th percentiles 
respectively of all impulse responses satisfying sign restrictions imposed.   
Variables: Share of total loans to total assets (SLOANS), Share of loans to firms 
to total loans (SCML), Share of consumer loans to total loans (SCNL), Share of 
mortgages to total loans (SMGL), Share of total securities to total assets (SSEC), 
Share of foreign public bonds to total public debt (SFBONDS), Operating costs / 
total assets (OCOSTS), Net interest margin (NIM), Liquid assets to customer & 
short term liabilities (LIQ), Leverage: total assets to equity (LEV), 
(ROA+capitalization)/time deviation of ROA (ZETA), ROA cross-sectional 
standard deviation (ROADEV), Growth of aggregate mortgages (GMGL), Interest 
rate of mortgages (TMGL), Growth of real house prices (RHP), Number of house 
transactions (NHT). 
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5.1. Durable surge shock: macroeconomic performance  
 
       
 
 
Impulse responses are accumulated and expressed in standardize units for all variables, except for observable variables, which are expressed in percentage points. The lines in 
impulse responses represent the 84th, 50th and 16th percentiles respectively of all impulse responses satisfying sign restrictions imposed.   
Variables: Growth of real activity indicator (Y), Growth of general consumer price index (P), Growth of relative consumption price: price of tradables/price of non-tradables 
(RCP), Growth of  real exchange rate (RER), Exchange rate gap (ERGAP), Money creation of fiscal origin to money base (FM), Foreign currency liquidations to money base 
(FCLQ), Growth of foreign currency value of private imports (IM), Implicit interest rate of liabilities (TID), Implicit interest rate of loans (TIL), Yield of foreign public bonds 
(YIELDFB), Growth of aggregate banks’ loans (GLOANS), Growth of aggregate banks’ securities (GSEC). 
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5.2. Durable surge shock: banks’ performance and housing market 
 
 
Impulse responses are accumulated and expressed in standardize units for all 
variables, except for observable variables, which are expressed in percentage 
points. The lines in impulse responses represent the 84th, 50th and 16th percentiles 
respectively of all impulse responses satisfying sign restrictions imposed.   
Variables: Share of total loans to total assets (SLOANS), Share of loans to firms 
to total loans (SCML), Share of consumer loans to total loans (SCNL), Share of 
mortgages to total loans (SMGL), Share of total securities to total assets (SSEC), 
Share of foreign public bonds to total public debt (SFBONDS), Operating costs / 
total assets (OCOSTS), Net interest margin (NIM), Liquid assets to customer & 
short term liabilities (LIQ), Leverage: total assets to equity (LEV), 
(ROA+capitalization)/time deviation of ROA (ZETA), ROA cross-sectional 
standard deviation (ROADEV), Growth of aggregate mortgages (GMGL), Interest 
rate of mortgages (TMGL), Growth of real house prices (RHP), Number of house 
transactions (NHT). 
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Appendix 3: List of variables used in the FAVAR  
Y Growth of real activity indicator
P Growth of general consumer price index
RCP Growth of relative consumption price: price of tradables/price of non-tradables
FM Money creation of fiscal origin to money base
FCLQ Foreign currency liquidations to money base
IM Growth of  foreign currency value of private imports
RER Growth of  real exchange rate
ERGAP Exchange rate gap
RHP Growth of real house prices
NHT Number of house transactions
YIELDFB Yield of foreign public bonds
SFBONDS Share of foreign public bonds to total public debt
NIM Net interest margin
CFUNDS Cost of funds to total deposits
OCOSTS Operating costs to total assets
LEV Leverage: total assets to equity
LIQ Liquid assets to customer & short term liabilities
ZETA (ROA+capitalization)/time deviation of ROA
ROADEV ROA cross-sectional standard deviation 
TNL Nominal interest rate of loans
TIL Implicit interest rate of loans
TMGL Interest rate of mortgages
TND Nominal interest rate of liabilities
TID Implicit interest rate of liabilities
GLOANS Growth of aggregate bank loans
GSEC Growth of aggregate bank securities
GCML Growth of aggregate loans to firms
GCNL Growth of aggregate consumer loans 
GMGL Growth of aggregate mortgages
SLOANS Share of total loans to total assets
SSEC Share of total securities to total assets
SCML Share of loans to firms to total loans
SCNL Share of consumer loans to total loans
SMGL Share of mortgages to total loans
Aggregate 
macroeconomic variables
Sectoral macroeconomic 
variables
Banking variables
 
 
